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This paper explores the long run consequences of the farm ’s own debt and the 
m oshav’s average debt on the farm household investment in productive capital stock, 
borrowing and consumption. In particular, the analysis focuses on the financial externalities 
that may arise from the moshav’s organisational principle of mutual responsibility for members’ 
debts. These externalities can have a considerable adverse effect on the capital stock and 
borrowing of the more efficient farms, and hence on their productive activity. These effects are 
studied within the framework of an optimal control model and summarised by a number of 
optimality conditions. The effects of the individual member’s position and the moshav’s 
financial position on farm investment and borrowing are estimated and tested in two cross- 




This paper deals with certain externalities which a cooperative organisation imposes on 
its members. These externalities arise when the cooperative acts as an association of 
individuals seeking to further their individual interests rather than to achieve a common goal 
(Cf. Zusman, 1983). Specifically, the present study analyses the economic implications of 
mutual liability for debts as practiced in Israel’s moshavim.
The moshav (singular of moshavim) is a semi-cooperative village consisting of about 70 
small family farms, each endowed with an equal land allotment averaging about 10 acres. The 
moshav’s members farm individually, but market their produce collectively. The value of a 
member’s collectively marketed produce is entered as a credit in the cooperative’s account, 
which can be used by the member for purchasing inputs and consumer goods. The cooperative 
in the moshav also acts as an intermediary between the members and financial institutions. In 
doing so, it maintains the principle of mutual responsibility for members’ debts through mutual 
co-signing.
Indeed, where institutional arrangements limit the use of land as collateral, credit 
sharing may be essential in making loans available to small farmers. In any event, financial 
cooperation can exploit economics of scale and risk-sharing to lower the cost of credit for 
cooperative members and reduce their administrative costs. (Zusman, 1988). However, 
financial cooperation may also lead to a ‘free-rider’ problem characteristic of price pooling: if 
debt behaviour is uncoordinated and the individual farm units are sufficiently small in size and 
large in number, farmers will not take into account the effect of their accumulated debt on the 
terms of credit and resale value of their farms. Consequently, they may leverage their farms 
more than is optimal.
Since 1921 more than 300 moshavim have been established. In the early stages of 
Israel’s development they played a critical role in providing agricultural goods for the general 
population; in establishing sovereignty over the country’s peripheral regions; and in absorbing 
many of the immigrants who came as refugees after the establishment of the state of Israel. In 
those pioneer years the cooperative organisation of the moshav carried substantial benefits for 
small farmholders, allowing them to exploit opportunities for scale economics by sharing
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agricultural equipment; through collective purchasing and marketing; and in credit sharing. 
Moreover, the implicit and mutual undertaking of moshav members to help each other in 
difficult times proved invaluable in the early years, allowing many of the moshavim to grow 
and prosper while maintaining an egalitarian framework.
Economic studies on the moshav have emphasised the aspects of cooperation, 
capitalisation, efficiency of production and equity. Haruvi and Kislev (1984) suggested that 
factors such as value of time and credit availability imply a reciprocal interaction between the 
level of capitalisation of the individual farm and the moshav’s level of collective marketing. A 
possible result of such interaction is a polarisation of moshavim with regard to economic 
performances. Using mid 1970s data on moshavim Sadan and Weintraub (1980) found that 
personal characteristics such as experience, schooling and cultural background are significant 
factors in determining farm income in moshavim. The management quality of farmers in 
moshavim was found to be a significant factor in Just, Zilberman and Hochman’s (1983) micro 
study on multicrop production functions in two moshavim in the 1970s. Nevertheless, Berck 
and Levy (1984); who simulated the consequences of different patterns of land allocation with a 
simultaneous equation system of production and labour supply estimated with the same mid 
1970s data used by Sadan and Weintraub (1980); concluded that the costs, in terms of income 
inequality of allocating land according to efficiency criteria is high, while the gains, in terms of 
value added, are modest.
During the 1980s, however, many of the less established moshavim have had severe 
financial difficulties and sunk into large debts. This is reflected in Table 1 below which 
describes the distribution and composition of debt and real interest rates paid on short-term 
liabilities in two moshavim which have given us direct access to their ledgers. The very high 
real interest rates and the large shares of short-term liabilities raise doubts about the ability of 
these semi-cooperative villages to withstand the financial crisis they are experiencing. There are 
exogenous reasons for these difficulties: government cuts in subsidies and support for the 
agricultural sector; a decline in the profitability of exports due to adverse changes in 
international exchange rates and delayed and insufficient depreciation of the Israeli currency;
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uncertainty and confusion which arise from Israel’s very high and accelerating rate of inflation 
which lead to high real interest rates.
But there are possibly significant endogenous reasons too: inefficient management, 
unduly large allocation of resources to consumption and residential investment, and the ‘free­
rider’ problem that arose from inadequate accounting systems. The very large debts that have 
resulted from these various factors have become the predominant problem of these semi­
cooperative villages and raise doubts regarding the suitability of their organisational structure in 
present conditions.
Table 1 Debt and Real Interest Rates In Three Moshavim, September 1983
Statistical summary of the debt distribution
among the moshav’s members Ratio of short­ Real interest
term liabilities rate paid on
M oshav Shape Mean Median Mode S td .D e v . to total short-term
(in US $) liab ilities liab ilities
M1 Lognormal 24,216 18,778 22,825 18,529 0.96 34.6%
M2 Lognormal 12,976 11,463 10,317 6,271 0.97 19.1%
The present study attempts to explore the long-run consequences of the farm own debt 
and the moshav’s average debt on farm household investment in productive capital stock and 
consumption. In particular, the analysis focuses on financial externalities that may arise from 
the moshav’s organisational principles of mutual responsibility. As we shall show, these can 
have considerable adverse effects on the capital investment and borrowing of the more efficient 
farms, relative to less efficient farms, especially in periods of recession when the financial 
position of the moshav is worsened. These effects are studied in section II within the 
framework of an optimal control model and summarised by a number of optimality conditions. 
The model’s implications with regard to the individual farmer’s borrowing, investment and 
consumption are discussed in section EH. The effects of the individual’s position, the moshav’s 
position and sociodemographic factors on the individual member’s investment and borrowing 
are estimated in section IV with two different types of data. The first data base provides micro 
information on 135 farms in two moshavim in 1983, while the second includes aggregate
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information on 82 moshavim for the same year. The paper is concluded with a brief summary 
in section V.
II MODEL
This section presents a simple formulation of the economic behaviour of a family farm 
in a moshav. The framework is dynamic and takes into account the unique and essential 
relationships between the single unit and the moshav organisation as regards the principles of 
mutual responsibility for members’ debts, and sharing of collective marketing and financial 
services provided by a purchasing organisation. A purchasing organisation is common to a 
number of nearby moshavim typically affiliated to the same ideological movement. In addition 
to purchasing agricultural products, it provides banking services to the moshavim and plays an 
important role in Israel’s so called “gray credit market”. Single farms do not have direct access 
to the purchasing organisation. They settle their business affairs with the moshav’s secretary 
and accounting offices. These authorised offices deal with the purchasing organisation. Hence, 
the farm’s debt is to the moshav, and the moshav’s debt is to the purchasing organisation.
The economic environment of the family farm can be characterised by the motion 
equations that describe the evolution of its stock of productive capital and debt:
K = I - 5K (1)
d s  D = C + I + i(AD)D - V(K,N) - w(l - N), 0 < N < 1 (2)
where,
K is the stock of productive capital (constructions, equipment, machines, livestock
orchards, etc.) in constant purchasing prices on the farm,
D is the farm household debt to the moshav (D |  0),
I is the farm’s current gross investment in productive capital,
d is the farm’s current borrowing,
8 is the rate of depreciation of capital,
i is the interest rate set by the purchasing organisation,
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AD is the moshav’s average debt (total moshav debt divided by the number of 
family farm),
N is the on farm labour supplied by the family household, 
w is the wage rate for off farm employment,
V is the on farm value added assumed to be an increasing and concave function in 
both K and N, and 
C is the farm household’s consumption.
In this framework, the implications of the moshav’s financial structure, and particularly 
that debts are mutually secured by all members of the moshav, is that the interest rate paid by 
the individual farm is that which is set by the purchasing organisation for the moshav as a 
whole, and is thus a function of the moshav’s average debt:
i = i(AD), and i '(A D )> 0 .1 (3)
Assuming the farmer’s temporal utility can be represented as an increasing, convex
function of current consumption, u(C), and that lim u'(C) = 0, we now postulate the
C -»°°
farmer’s decision problem as choosing consumption, investment and on farm labour2 over a 
known finite horizon (0, T) so as to maximise the value of the discounted utility stream and the 
“salvage value” S(T) measured in utilities and associated with the assets of the farm at the 
terminal time T
max J e-r tU(C(T))dt + S(T) (4)
• 0
subject to the constraints (1) and (2), C > 0, K(0) > 0 and K(T) > 0.
The farm’s salvage value should incorporate the effects of the members’ own debt (D) 
and the moshav’s average debt (AD). Both have a negative effect on the farm’s resale value, 
the latter because of the mutual responsibility for debts and the effect of the moshav’s average 
debt on its cooperative reputation. We therefore specify the farm’s salvage value as follows
6
ST = R(ADt )Kt  - M(ADt , Dt) (5)
where R is a function which translates K (measured as accumulated net investments, at constant 
prices) to its resale value in utiles. It is assumed that R represents the moshav’s reputation and 
hence decreases with A D j. M denotes the loss of utility due to the member’s liability for his 
own and the moshav's debt. Because of the mutual co-signing principle, M is assumed to 
increase with the farm’s own debt and the moshav’s average debt. Summing up, we assume
dR „ 9M 3M „ , 92M 
dADr < ° ’ d D j ’ A D t > 0 and 5D t0A D t ° ‘
The Hamiltonian for the problem specified in (4) is 
H = e 'rt U(V(K, N) + w (l - N) + d - I - i(AD)D) + h ( l  - 5K) + X2d. (6)
The variables K, D, N, C, I, and %2 must obey the constraints and the auxiliary equations 
M  = -e-rtUCVK + ?ti6 (7a)
©
X2 = e 'rt UCi(AD) (7b)
the optimality conditions for interior solution (i.e., assuming that control constraints are not 
binding)
t\T_T
g g  = e 'n UC(VN ■ w) = 0 (8a)
^  = -e« UC + = 0 (8b)
= e-rt UC + h  = 0 (8c)
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and the transversality conditions
K(T) > 0, X i(T)>R(A D T)
K(T) [Xi(T) - R(ADt)] = 0 (9a)
Xl(T> = - ^ ( D t , A D t ) .  (9b)
It is important to note that in the derivation of the auxiliary equation (7b) we assume that 
the single farm considers its effect on the moshav’s average debt to be negligible, i.e., 3AD/9D 
= 0. The assumption reflects the ‘free-rider’ problem characteristic of price pooling. In 
support of this assumption we mention that a typical moshav consists of about seventy small 
farms endowed with equal size of land (ten acres) and water allotments.
It is also important to note that the path of AD is only known ex post. Thus, the above 
analysis should be viewed as adopting the common practice to rely on what is called certainty 
equivalence. This procedure takes the solution to the certainty model and replaces the unknown 
AD with their conditional expected value given the information available. My impression from 
working with several of the financially distressed moshavim is that due to an inefficient 
accounting system the information available to a moshav's member is on the values of AD and 
D a year ago (AD_i and D.i); and that due to a severe lack of coordination of and information 
about the allocation of credit, there was a common belief among the moshav’s members that the 
discrepancy between AD and AD„i is nothing but a white noise. Conversely, the empirical 
analyses in section IV will consider the one-year lages of the state variables as explanatories.
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III MODEL’S IMPLICATIONS
In this section we present the model’s implications as regards the members’ debts, 
capital stocks and consumption.
A. Effect o f the Moshav Average Debt on the Member’s Debt 
From the optimality conditions (8b) and (8c)
kl(t) = -X2(t). (10)
This result and the transversality conditions imply that for K(T) > 0
R(ADt ) = ^ ( D T,ADT). (11)
Given the expected ADt , the member’s terminal own debt can be found from (11).
The moshav’s rule of debt repayment (M) plays an important role in the determination 
of the members’ terminal debts3. Total differential of equation (11) implies
dR 32M
dD j _ dADj_____5Dt5ADt
dADr "  32m
3D^
11 dR A . 32M ^ _and by our assumptions that < 0 and -  0
(12)
dDj > n 32M < „ 
dADr < 0 as aD2 > 0
/52M \i.e.; given a less restrictive rule of debt repayment f^ 2  < 0 j , a larger expected terminal
moshav’s average debt encourages the accumulation of debts. Conversely, given a punitive 
/02M \
rule > ’ a ârSer expected terminal moshav’s average debt discourages the
accumulation of debts by the moshav’s members.
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B . Effect o f the Moshav’s Average Debt on Capital Stock
The transversality condition (9a) implies that for K(T) > 0
Xl(T) = R(ADt) ( 13)
and since dR/dAD < 0, the larger the expected A D j the lower the shadow price of the farm’s 
capital (X],(T)), and thus, the smaller the terminal stock of capital the member would like to 
hold. This indicates another possibility which may arise if, as is likely, there are exogenous 
limits on the amount which may be borrowed, or if the marginal utility of consumption does not 
vanish asymptotically. Then if ADx is expected to grow very large there may be no feasible 
level of consumption, C j, that satisfies the equation e_rTUc(CT) = R(ADt ). implying that 
K(T) = 0. In other words, if other moshav members are accumulating large debts the best 
course of action may be to liquidate the farm as a productive unit. We should therefore expect 
to find, in practice, a positive association between the average debt of the moshav and the 
proportion of its units not in active operation in the long run.
From equation (10) we can further obtain that
and reconsidering (7a), (7b) and (8b) we can show that along the optimal path the marginal 
product of capital should be equal to the user cost
By totally differentiating equation (15) and the optimality condition (8a) (Vn (K,N) = w) and 
assuming that w remains the same we obtain that
Vk (K, N) = i(AD) + 5. (15)
dk = (16)
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Recalling the assumptions that i' > 0 and V is concave (i.e., Vkk < Vnn  < 0 and Vnn  Vkk -
2
Vkn  > 0), an increase in the moshav’s current average debt reduces the capital stock the 
individual farm is willing to hold. Note however that if the credit-sharing system is abolished, 
farmers whose debt is equal to or greater than the average debt would seek to hold less capital 
than under credit sharing. This is due to the fact that under private credit arrangement the 
marginal cost of debt capital includes the effect of incremental debt on the interest rate 
(i.e., i + i'(D)D and not just i).
To fix ideas and motivate the subsequent empirical analysis let us consider the special 
case in which V is Cobb-Douglas
V = ADa i N“2 , 0 < a i ,  a 2 < 1. (17)
In this case equation (16) becomes
dK =
i'(AD)








a i  ( a i  - 1) - a  j <*2/(012 - 1)
(V/K)-1 dAD. (19)
In this context, the ratio of value added to capital (V/K) can be viewed as a measure of farm 
efficiency. Thus, whatever the direction of the debt, less efficient farms may be expected to 
respond to changes in the current average debt of the moshav by changing their current 
productive capital stock at a faster rate than more efficient farms.
C. Effect o f the Moshav's Average Debt on Consumption
By differentiating both sides of the optimality condition (8b) with respect to t we obtain
11
re 'rt U c - e_rt U ccC  + = 0 
©
and substituting (7a) and (8b) for and Xi
(20)
[r + 5 -  VK (K, N)] UC - UccC = 0. (21)
Recalling (15) and Pratt’s (1964) measure of absolute risk aversion RA = -Ucc/Uc. equation 
(21) can be rendered as follows:
The underlying reason is that the more myopic the member (i.e., the larger r) and the lower the 
costs of credit, the more will be consumed today and the less in future periods. Since the cost 
of credit is increasing in AD, the cooperative organisation of the moshav encourages 
consumption in earlier periods by those members whose debts are greater than the average, vis- 
a-vis private farming.
IV EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The empirical analysis presented in this section comprises two parts. The first part (A) 
tests whether an increase in the moshav’s average debt acts to reduce the stock of productive 
capital, and whether less efficient farms change their capital stock at a faster rate than more 
efficient farms. The test is based on Equation 19 and is carried out with 135 micro 
observations on individual farms in two moshavim. The second part (B) of the empirical 
analysis estimates the investment-borrowing simultaneous equation system which is defined in 
accordance to the solution to the optimisation problem of section II. In order to avoid the 
confusion between the effect of the moshav’s financial position and a general moshav’s effect,
C = [i(A D)-r] (22)
This result implies that
C |  0 as i(AD) |  r.
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which is inherent in utilising individual farm observations from a small number of moshavim, 
the estimation of the investment-borrowing system is performed with aggregate observations on 
82 moshavim.
A Empirical Evidence on the Effect o f the Average Debt on the Individual Farm Capital
Stock
Our empirical test of the effect of the moshav’s average debt on the individual farm’s 
capital accumulation is based on data of two selected moshavim in which the phenomenon of 
debt accumulation is extremely noticeable. The data were obtained from the moshavim's 
ledgers and from the Jewish Agency Agricultural-Demographical Annual Censuses, and include 
observations on capital stock, debt, value added (measured in 10,000 shekels in September 
1983 prices) and characteristics of 135 family farms for the years 1982 and 1983. In each 
moshav the distribution of debts among the members conforms roughly to a lognormal curve, 
and exhibit substantial inequality. The mean, median and mode of these distributions increase 
significantly as time progresses.
With these pooled cross-section observations we continue our analysis from section 
IIIB by testing whether an increase in the moshav’s average debt reduces or increases the 
individual farm’s productive capital stock, and whether the rate of change varies with the farm’s 
level of efficiency. We conduct this test within the framework of equation (19) and subject to 
the simplifying assumption that i"(AD) = 0. We also take into account possible variation 
among the family farms through the inclusion of available characteristics such as farm age 
(FAGE), family size (SIZE), farmer nativity (ISNT) and off-farm occupation of the head of the 
family (OFOC). The last two variables are dummy which are defined as follows:
r 1 if Israeli born 
ISNT = \
10 if an immigrant
(in our sample all immigrants came to Israel from the Middle East and North Africa subsequent 
to the creation of the state),
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r 1 if high skill and professional employment 
OFOC = \
10 other.
The following equation presents the ordinary least squares’ estimates of the regression 
coefficients, and their t-ratios are given in the parentheses:
K .t i k - l  = -0.03505 - O ^ m O -^ V /K )^  (ADt -A D t.i)
(0.415) (3.201)
- 0.00596 FAGE + 0.00323 SIZE 
(2.121) (0.396)
- 0.03720 ISNT - 0.07691 OFOC + residual 
(0.397) (0.711) (23)
O Awith Rz = 0.133, F = 3.948 and 129 degrees of freedom. Although the model explains only a
small proportion of the variance of the rate of capital accumulation, the F test shows that the
estimates are simultaneously significant.4
The significant negative coefficient associated with (V/K)t ^ (ADt - ADt-i) indicates
that an increase in the moshav’s average debt acts to reduce the stock of productive capital, and 
that less efficient farms do indeed change their capital stock at a faster rate than more efficient 
farms.
The negative and significant estimate associated with FAGE indicates that, ceteris 
paribus, newer farms invest more. Since in the Israeli moshavim farm age and farmer age are 
positively and highly correlated, this result can be further reasoned by life-cycle arguments. 
The effect of family size on farm investment may be viewed as the discrepancy between two 
opposing effects. On the one hand, a larger family, ceteris paribus, may have a larger labour 
force and hence a greater income. On the other hand, a large family spends much on 
consumption. As the estimate associated with SIZE is not significantly different from zero this 
may indicate that these effects offset one another. The nativity variable proxies cultural and 
educational differences between the more westernised Israeli bom farmers and the immigrants
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from the Middle East and North Africa. The estimation results show that the effect of these 
differences on investment are insignificant.
Many of the moshavim’s members also work off the farm. High skill off-farm 
employment can successfully compete with income from farming and hence may reduce 
investment. The estimation result, however, indicates that, ceteris paribus, the rate of capital 
accumulation is insignificantly affected by off-farm employment.
B Estimation o f the Investment-Borrowing Behaviour with Aggregate Data on 82
Moshavim
The set of the first-order conditions for maximum utility presented in the previous 
section constitutes a simultaneous equation system in which the control variable I (net 
investment), d (borrowing) and N (labour) are the dependent variables; and the one-period 
laged stated variables D .i, K„i and AD.j are the independent variables. The following 
estimation of this system is carried out with data provided by the Jewish Agency Agricultural- 
Demographical Census for 1983 which encompasses 82 moshavim in Israel’s Negev 
(southern) region. This data source does not include information on labour. Under the 
assumption of equal amount of on-farm work days in all the sampled moshavim, the empirical 
analysis is restricted to the estimation of the investment-borrowing structural and reduced form 
parameters. Since each observation refers to a moshav and variation exists in the moshav’s 
number of family farms, D .i, K .i, I and d are taken as average values (in 1983 million 
shekels), and thus indicate the position and behaviour of the representative member farm.
The analysis also takes into account the effects of the moshav’s population structure on 
investment and borrowing through the inclusion of the rate of Israeli-born farmers (RIBF) and 
the average farmer age (AGE) in the moshav. The interaction of these sociodemographic 
variables captures the distinct three-generation’s structure which is typical to the moshavim 
included in the sample. The first generation comprises Jewish refugees from Arab countries 
who immigrated to Israel in the early 1950’s and settled in the newly established moshavim. 
They had in 1983 an average of 28 years of farming experience, but suffered from lack of 
country-specific skill and low level of education. The second generation of farmers comprises 
the younger brothers and the elder sons of the first generation farmers. They had been also
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bom abroad, but because of their younger age enjoyed Israeli schooling and other benefits 
associated with growing up in Israel which equipped them with the new country-specific skill. 
Members of this generation of farmers had in 1983 an average of 18 years of farming 
experience. The third generation of farmers are the younger Israeli-born sons of the first 
generation farmers and had a relatively short farming experience of about 5 years in 1983.
It is important to note that with these cross-section data the average debt in a moshav 
(AD) is now interpreted as the representative farm’s debt and hence can no longer be viewed as 
a source of external effects as indicated in the conceptual analysis. In order to incorporate 
possible external effects of the financial cooperative’s position on the representative member 
some modification is required. The following regression equations include the moshav debt- 
capital ratio (leverage) at the end of the last period (MDCR_i) as an indicator of the moshav’s 
financial position.
Consequently, the following analysis tests: (1) the effects of the representative 
member’s position as indicated by D_i and K_j on his investment and borrowing; (2) the 
effects of the demographic structure of the moshav (RIBF and AGE) on investment and 
borrowing; and (3) the effects of the moshav’s financial position as reflected by MDCR_i on 
the representative member’s investment and borrowing. The estimates of these effects and their 
t-ratios (in parentheses) are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 below. While Table 2 indicates 
only the direct effects of the exogenous variables, D-i, K_i, RIBF, AGE and MDCR-i on the 
representative member’s current investment and borrowing, the estimated parameters in Table 3 
also include the indirect effects and hence exhibit the full effects of the independent variables on 
the representative member’s investment and borrowing. The age variable is excluded from the 
borrowing equation by the estimation program due to low level of tolerance. Therefore, and in 
order to obtain identification, this variable is also excluded from the borrowing equation in the 
three-stage least squares estimation. Furthermore, best estimation results of the structural 
parameters are obtained when RIBF is omitted from the investment equation.




Three-stage least squares estimates of the investment-borrowing 






























Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
Form ’s Parameters.





























R2 adjusted 0.463 0.085
F-test statistic 14.972 2.887
Degrees of freedom 76 77
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1. Investment and borrowing are mutually dependent —  the availability of credit increases 
investment, which in turn increases borrowing. The former effect is statistically 
insignificant whereas the latter is significant.
2. The direct and full effects of the representative member’s debt on his levels of 
investment are positive but statistically insignificant, whereas the direct and full effects 
of the representative member’s debt on his borrowing are both negative and statistically 
significant. The full effect of the representative member’s debt on borrowing is 
moderated by the positive direct effect of the debt on investment, which is transmitted 
through the positive direct effect of investment on borrowing. These results indicate 
that in view of their relatively large debts and the high interest rates farmers reduce their 
current borrowing but not necessarily at the expense of investment in production capital.
3. As can be reasoned by a diminishing marginal product’s argument, the direct and full 
effects of the representative farmer’s capital stock on net investment are negative and 
statistically significant. In contrast, the direct and indirect effects of the representative 
farm’s capital stock on borrowing are positive and statistically significant. A possible 
explanation is that a larger stock of capital may be associated with a larger production 
activity which necessitates a larger credit for buying perishable inputs. Note that the full 
effect of the capital stock on borrowing is moderated by a negative indirect effect which 
stems from the negative effect of capital stock on investment and the positive effect of 
investment on borrowing.
4. The estimates associated with RIBF are statistically significant and indicate that, all 
other things being equal, Israeli-born farmers invest less and borrow more than their 
immigrant counterparts. The OLS estimation of the reduced form also represents a 
significant negative effect of age on investment. Since the interaction of RIBF and AGE 
captures the three-generation structure of the moshav’s farmer population, these results 
can be interpreted as indicating that the less efficient farmers of the first and third
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generations ‘free ride’ on the backs of the more efficient farmers of the second 
generation by worsening the moshav’s financial position as regards debt-capital ratio.
5. The estimates associated with MDCR.i indicate that the moshav’s leverage deters 
individual’s investment and encourages further individual’s borrowing. It is important 
to note that only the latter effect is statistically significant. In view of the previous 
result, the estimates of the effects of MDCR-i confirm the a priori expectations of a 
‘free-rider’ problem in Israel’s semi-cooperative villages.
V CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper the economic implications of mutually secured debts in Israel’s semi­
cooperative villages were conceptually and empirically analysed. The conceptual model 
suggested that there should be a negative relationship between the stock of capital the individual 
farm is willing to hold and the moshav’s average debt, and that less efficient farms tend to 
respond to changes in the moshav’s average debt by changing their productive capital stock at a 
faster rate than more efficient farms. This hypothesis was confirmed by the estimation results 
which referred to 135 family farms in two financially distressed moshavim.
The conceptual model also suggested that the individual’s decision on investment and 
borrowing are made simultaneously and are affected by the individual member’s position as 
regards debt and capital stock and the moshav’s financial position. The estimation of an 
investment-borrowing simultaneous equation system with aggregate data on 82 moshavim 
yielded statistically significant and meaningful results. The estimates associated with the 
sociodemographical variables, included in the analysis to capture the typical three-generation 
structure of the moshav’s farmer population indicated that the less efficient farmers of the first 
and third generations ‘free rode’ on the backs of the more efficient farmers of the second 
generation and increased the moshav’s debt-capital ratio. It was found that such an increase 
deterred investment and encouraged further borrowing and thus perpetuated and intensified the 
moshav’s distress.
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Other conclusions that emerged from the conceptual model but were not tested in the 
empirical analysis are that the level of consumption varies directly with the average debt of the 
moshav. And in comparison to private farming, the cooperative organisation of the moshav 
encourages consumption in earlier periods by those members whose debts are greater than the 
average. Finally, the moshav’s rule for setting members’ debts affects the impact of the 
moshav’s average debt on the individual member’s current debt. If the .rule is lenient, a large 
expected terminal debt will encourage the accumulation of debt by members; while if the rule is 
punitive, it will discourage debt accumulation.
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FOOTNOTES
1. A similar relationship between the interest rate and debt was also assumed by Hochman, 
Hochman and Razin (1973). For further discussion of the financial aspects in 
moshavim see Haruvi and Kislev (1984) who specified the interest rate as a function of 
both borrowing and the moshav’s cooperative revenue. For simplicity and as our 
empirical analysis focuses on moshavim that borrow much more than they earn, we 
choose to neglect the latter factor.
2. The allocation of time between leisure and labour is disregarded. It is assumed, for 
simplicity, that a fixed proportion of the time is devoted to work.
3. For further analysis of the selection of repayment rules of members’ debt in agriculture 
cooperative associations and their efficiency and welfare consequences see Zusman 
(1983 and 1988).
4. A higher R2 was obtained when equation (18) was fitted to the data. The effect of the 
moshav’s average debt on the desired level of capital stock remained negative and 
highly significant. The following equation presents the OLS estimates of the regression 
coefficients, and their t-ratios are given in the parentheses:
Kj -̂ M  = 17760.811 - 0.274.lO'7 (V/K2) ^  (ADt - ADt_i)
(0.652) (10.151)
-783.0346 FAGE - 3262.837 SIZE 
(0.873) (1.238)
-25815.732 ISNT - 55276.278 OFOC + residual 
(0.856) (1.586)
R2 = 0.481 and F = 23.895.
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